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i

Spanning the globe, the British Empire was a political entity unlike any the world
has ever seen and its decolonization was truly a global phenomenon to match. Beginning
in 1931 and lasting through much of the twentieth century, the British Empire steadily
began to grant self-government and full autonomy to its member states, releasing “fortynine territories ... in the years 1947-80” alone. 1 Yet, imperial policy modifications were
not the only transitions necessary for colonies to gain their autonomy. Radical changes
were occurring across the Empire socially, culturally, and intellectually—including
changes in the way that colonial groups thought about themselves. To elaborate, in order
for nationalist movements to develop in the colonies, their populations had to redefine
themselves in terms outside the British Empire; before convincing the British that they
constituted a nation, a colony first had to believe it themselves. Furthermore, because this
self-understanding is a necessary precursor to a nationalist movement, it is logical that a
pattern in the process may exist. In order to investigate, this study establishes a
theoretical framework of changes that must occur during a nationalist movement’s bid for
autonomy. Through the lens of this framework, I intend to analyze the ways that colonies
began to conceive of themselves as separate, distinct nations—specifically in the cases of
the Dominions and India—paying particular attention to recurring processes. 2 By doing

1

Brian Lapping, End of Empire (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), xv. Lapping is a former
professional journalist turned documentarian: End of Empire is a book written in tandem with his
documentary series by the same title.
2
In itself, the thesis of a patterned process of decolonization has been pursued by other scholars before me;
however, my research is unique in its focus upon the Dominions and India within the British Empire as
well as the emphasis on their similarity in spite of their considerably differing contexts. Examples of
previous works that supported the existence of a pattern include Trevor Lloyd, Empire: The History of the
British Empire (London: Hambledon and London, 2001), which suggests African colonies followed the
example of the Muslim League in India, Andrew Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the
Second World War (New York: Continuum, 2008), proposes that the strains of the Second World War
affected the Dominions through similar stages in the relationship with Great Britain, and A.G. Hopkins,
“Rethinking Decolonization,” Past & Present 200 (August 2008): 211-47, which proposes that the
Dominions were an integral part of the overall decolonization process for the British Empire. For an
example of research that does not directly propose a recurring pattern across the Empire, see Robert
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so, I intend to demonstrate that the changes that occurred in each colony’s understanding
of their “nation” were quite similar, even though they produced widely different
outcomes for the Dominions and India. In fact, despite their fundamental diversity, the
Dominions and India followed a pattern of changes in national self-perception as they
appealed for independence from the British Empire. This study proposes a framework of
four prerequisite changes to the idea of the “nation” that preceded the achievement of
independence and argues that, in spite of great diversity among colonies, the challengers
to British rule did exhibit each characteristic in the cases presented. Additionally, I will
also argue that the pattern is an inherently unifying force that is closely tied to nationalist
leaders, whose rhetoric and political activities highlight the changing perceptions of the
nation when scrutinized appropriately. Lastly, while these changes unified the
populations of the Dominions, the phenomenon in India eventually resulted in the
partition of the colony into the states of India and Pakistan. Nonetheless, the case still
supports the overall argument as the divergence was caused by the actions of nationalist
leaders who fostered lingering ideas of separate communities to which connotations of
the nation became attached, causing the split. First, though, for these conclusions to be
accessible, a definition of the “nation” must be established.
The term “nation” has been used in innumerable ways throughout academia and
the world at large. Its meanings vary with each use, heavily dependent upon the
predispositions of the user, ranging anywhere from straightforward, geographicallyJohnson, British Imperialism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003). However, none of these studies
place the Dominions in direct comparison with India as this study does. Additionally, the framework I
propose is, to my knowledge, an entirely unique application of Benedict Anderson’s and Anthony Smith’s
theories of the “nation,” as detailed in Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983) and Anthony Smith, Nationalism in the
Twentieth Century (Oxford, UK: Martin Roberston, 1979), respectively. So, by focusing exclusively on the
cases of the Dominions and India through this original framework derived from Anderson and Smith, this
study adds to the intellectual debate regarding the decolonization of the British Empire.
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defined entities shown on a map to more indefinite types like ethno-cultural (e.g. the
Roma or “Gypsies”) or religious (e.g. the Muslim umma). Naturally, these complexities
require clarification. For the purposes of this study, the term “nation” serves as a
hybridized ethno-cultural term that draws heavily upon the theories of Benedict Anderson
and Anthony Smith. For Anderson, a “nation … is an imagined political community” in
the sense that it is “both inherently limited and sovereign.” 3 In his interpretation, the
nation is “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each
lives the image of their communion.” 4 This process, in Anderson’s view, is steeped in a
sense of simultaneity, which might best be described as a person’s conscious and
“complete confidence” in the “steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity” of people
within the nation. 5 Put another way, by associating themselves with the nation, each
member recognizes their place alongside the perpetual, parallel existence of many others.
Once this “imagined” form is achieved, a nation is limited in the understanding that it has
boundaries outside of which other nations inevitably exist, sovereign because all nations
strive for freedom, which can only truly be achieved through complete sovereignty, and
lastly a community because “it is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” in
spite of “actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail.” 6 Anderson’s vision of a
“nation,” then, depends as much upon self-image as any tangible group.
Echoing Anderson in many ways, Anthony Smith’s definitions of a “nation” also
revolve around intellectual understandings rather than concrete clusters of people or

3

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.
Ibid.
5
Ibid., 26. For a broader discussion of Anderson’s simultaneity concept, see Ibid., 22-36.
6
Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7.
4
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physically defined states. In Smith’s formulation, any “nation is distinct and unique …
has its peculiar contribution to make to the whole, the family of nations … and defines
the identity of its members, because its specific culture moulds the individual.” 7
Moreover, each nation’s culture is defined by its history, which “binds present and future
generations, like links in a chain, to all those who preceded them.” 8 Smith’s words
indicate a similar understanding of the nation as a bounded entity that recognizes the
presence of other nations. Each nation possesses a common historical culture that
provides a sense of community as well as definition. In addition, for Smith, a nation also
“entails a certain kind of solidarity and political programme,” nationalism, that “is based
on the possession of the land: … the historic land; the land of past generations,” an
attachment grounded in the historical culture. 9 However, Smith distinguishes his theory
by asserting that nationalists (promoters of the “political programme” of the nation)
inherently “adapt the vision, the culture, the solidarity and the programme to diverse
situations and interests” as a means of dissemination. 10 Put another way, a nation is
commonly expanded through “top down” processes, by nationalist leader who publicize
and thereby circulate their program of identity and politics. While Anderson discusses
the “top down” utility of the nation and nationalism at length, he ultimately concludes
this application of nationalist rhetoric as a means of active expansion only developed as a
later process in the historical lifespan of the concept of nations, rather than being an
inherent component of idea from the beginning. 11 All the same, the definitions overlap in
7

Smith, Nationalism, 2. For a later example of Smith’s ideas on nations that incorporates Anderson’s work,
see Anthony Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002).
8
Ibid., 3.
9
Ibid., 3.
10
Ibid., 4.
11
In his book, Anderson discusses “official nationalisms” as a subsection of “nationalism” itself. Official
nationalisms were developed in reaction to the emergence of organic nations and nationalism throughout
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a number of overt ways. To summarize, then, my definition stems from within each of
these academic trends. As far as this study is concerned, a nation is an insubstantial idea,
within which someone associates themselves along historically based cultural ties and is
connected to a geographical location that can be defined explicitly or ambiguously, but
does not necessarily incorporate all inhabitants within that location nor does the group
necessarily reside in that territory. Additionally, this nation is bounded by these
attachments. In short, a “nation” is very much an intellectual concept that is continually
subject to redefinition over time, and it is this process of redefinition from the “top down”
that pertains to this study.
In order to observe and compare the redefinition of each colony’s selfperceptions, a framework of four prerequisite changes has been formulated from the
characterization of the “nation.” Each prerequisite represents a fundamental part of the
definition of a “nation;” therefore, the list of four prerequisites will serve as a checklist
for each victorious nationalist movement and, eventually, for comparison within this
framework. For instance, the most basic of these prerequisite changes to the conception
of the nation is whether or not a colonial population views themselves as a distinctly
unified group. Many times, sticking closely to Anderson’s theories, the transition toward
ideas of unity is fostered through processes of simultaneity—e.g. repeated references to
the entity in newspapers or to a perceived common heroic past. In this case, each colony
had to become aware of or build an identifiable historical past that was distinguishable in

Europe in the 1820s. From this point on, Anderson attests that the ideas implied in a nation could be and
frequently were adapted by leaders to address specific issues or incorporate new people. However, this
phenomenon was not an inherent aspect of a nation in his definition. For further information on official
nationalisms, see Anderson, Imagined Communities, 83-112; for details about the natural development of
“imagined communities” (i.e. nations) prior to the appearance of official nationalisms, see Ibid., 37-46, 615, 67-82.
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some manner from the history associated with the British Empire’s nation. Additionally,
of the four, this prerequisite is arguably the most foundational, but it is difficult to say
that it generally appears first as each of these criteria are fundamentally intertwined to the
others. Referring back to Anderson and Smith, this prerequisite is synonymous with the
idea of the nation being “imagined,” as groups must be able to recognize their
membership within a unified group, whose members they could never hope to meet. So,
for purposes of analysis, this prerequisite will be considered fulfilled when the rhetoric of
prominent, popular political figures (e.g. leaders of majority parties that eventually
assumed control of the government) or newspapers refer to the people of the group in
terms of the nation or refer to that imagined community’s past or traditions. Put
differently, the “imagined” prerequisite is fulfilled when popular leaders can utilize
rhetoric of the nation they are promoting because the members of that nation are expected
to infer that the message is for them, i.e. their inclusion in this unified entity is ubiquitous
at that point.
Based in the common history and unity of the “imagined” prerequisite, the second
prerequisite can most appropriately be linked to ideas of the limitations upon the nation.
To elaborate, because a nation exists in a world among other nations and is therefore
limited, any group striving to assume nationhood must be able to recognize the
differences between their nation and external ones and thereby determine who belongs to
the group. In this case, for a nationalist group or colony to gain their independence, it
was necessary to recognize that their perceived nation lay outside the British Empire, in
direct opposition to the idea that the colony was positioned within the national entity of
the Empire itself. In many colonies, national groups often originally felt their best
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interests were well represented by the British Empire’s greater interests, particularly in
the cases of the Dominions. As time wore on, though, colonial nationalists came to
recognize an erosion of common vested interests. In turn, these perceived disconnections
between the perceived best interests of the colony and British goals and activities fuelled
a sense of disillusionment with British leadership. As feelings of disenchantment with
the Empire became more pervasive, groups increasingly recognized the disunity of
interests between their nation and the British Empire. Clearly, this realization facilitated
a shift in the idea of how their nation was related to the Empire. Whereas the colony
once held common interests with the British Empire, the nationalists’ growing frustration
with British leadership revealed that the British were actually outside their nation, thus
reinforcing the sense of limitations by promoting an “us” (the nation) and “them”
(outside groups represented here by the British) mentality. With this in mind, rhetoric
that promotes this “us and them” mentality or reveals a sense of disillusionment with
British leadership can be said to fulfill the “limited” prerequisite by cultivating ideas of
separation between the British Empire and the growing nation.
Alongside the growing perception of divisions between the British and emerging
national identity, the “community” prerequisite often emerged as a close parallel to the
“limited” one. As the other processes mature, the embryonic nation begins to recognize
that its internally unified interests are misrepresented by the external British. Therefore,
the group must soon develop a means of presenting their common interests as a group.
Concisely, the imagined and limited ideas foster desires for self-sufficiency and accurate
representation that buttress the idea of “community.” Of course, the “community”
prerequisite is closely linked to the perceived differences and limitations between the
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nation and the British, but it is also different in that the “community” prerequisite extends
one step further, to active pursuit of community goals. While the limited prerequisite can
be demonstrated by the recognition of divergent interests and rhetoric of disenchantment,
the “community” prerequisite is embodied by active attempts to pursue the interests that
have been recognized as unique or distinct. These efforts can be manifested in a variety
of ways, whether cultural (festivals attesting to national heritage or tradition), economic
(strikes, protests), diplomatic (foreign relations only), or any other means of asserting the
group’s reliance on itself. By actively taking up activities designed to address the
specific interests of the group members, the nation assumes responsibility for its concerns
and seeks to openly display their acceptance of this charge. Therefore, public exhibitions
become symbolic of an emerging nation’s self-sufficiency and independent interests—
thus attesting to the existence of separate nation. Certainly, by undertaking exhibitions
publicly, the nation implies that it constitutes a self-reliant “community,” attempts to
establish its capabilities and distinctiveness in the eyes of external nations, and satisfies
the third prerequisite.
Finally, the “sovereignty” prerequisite is also a critical component of the
necessary changes to the self-perception of the nation. Naturally catalyzed by the other
three prerequisites, the “sovereignty” prerequisite is relatively clear-cut: a group must
seek to assert its sovereignty—an indication of desires for freedom—to fully constitute a
nation. Simply put, a group must pursue domestic and international political change, in
the form of constitutional reform, for the prerequisite to be completed. However, the
group must go beyond mere requests for such reforms in order to distinguish these efforts
from the evidence of the “community” prerequisite; their demands must, eventually, be
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successful in attaining constitutional reforms, thereby gaining measures of literal
sovereignty. Most often, the constitutional reforms represent steps toward full autonomy
for the nation and concessions from the imperial sovereign, in this case the British.
Demands for constitutional measures of self-government, full autonomy, reduction of
British control, or withdrawal of British bureaucracy and forces are frequent indications
of progress toward completion of this prerequisite. Of course, the “sovereignty”
prerequisite is only genuinely satisfied in the moment of ultimate constitutional
autonomy, but, by examining the rhetoric of leaders and other evidence, the progress
toward that goal can be uncovered as well, just as the combined framework reveals the
overall progress.
In applying this framework, though, this study operates on several overarching
assumptions. First, it is assumed that a nation must fulfill all of the prerequisites before
becoming an autonomous state. Second, it is ventured that the evidence of a
prerequisite’s fulfillment is manifested in an observable, public manner through the
rhetoric of nationalist leaders, which contributes to the developing culture of
simultaneity. Third, this study also operates under the impression that nationalist leaders
are representative of their supporters’ views of the nation. In this regard, Smith’s
definition suggests that the leaders promote their ideas through their positions as leaders.
In turn, acceptance of this “top down” dissemination mechanism implies that a given
leader would cease to be relevant in a nationalist movement if their message were not
being accepted by the intended audience of the nation. Thus, a leader’s continued
prominence implies a cycle of successful intellectual diffusion, thereby garnering
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supporters whose ideas the leader now represents. 12 Finally, in light of the three previous
assumptions, it is henceforth presumed that, by selecting the most prominent leaders, the
dominant views of the nation can be accessed. Therefore, by combining the four
prerequisites under these assumptions, a single cohesive framework is created through
which the wealth of intensive studies of individual movements can be applied to expose
broader, empire-wide trends or to facilitate comparisons.
Despite the potential for this framework to be applied across the entirety of the
British Empire, this study is restricted to comparisons of the Dominions, India, and
Pakistan for several reasons. Now, granted that the British Empire’s decolonization was
very much an individualized process, the framework above attempts to circumvent many
such issues by standardizing the method of analysis the ways that very different colonies
identified themselves as a nation. However the Dominions and Indian colony were
undeniably treated differently by the British, a situation that is emphasized by the manner
in which L.J. Butler divides the colonies into three categories based on the ways that they
were governed within British Empire:
The most senior members of the empire, the “Dominions” or “[white] settlement
colonies” constituted a distinct group. Between the [world] wars, their sometimes
ambiguous relationship with London would be clarified and given statutory form.
India, long considered the most valuable “possession”, was so important in the
imperial schema that it technically constituted an empire in its own right. The
remainder of the dependent empire defied the taxonomer’s art, being composed of
around 60 colonies, protectorates, and other constitutional abstractions. 13

Clearly, the distribution of colonies across Butler’s three categories is heavily
disproportionate, grouping the vast majority of colonies within the final ambiguous
12

Of course, this cyclical formulation is not the only means by which a nationalist leader can garner new
supporters, but it is the only mechanism with which this study is concerned.
13
L.J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 1.
Butler is a history lecturer at the University of Bedfordshire, formerly Luton University, in England.
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group. His distinctions pay homage to the fundamentally different approaches that
Britain and her officials took toward each group. The Dominions were informally
allowed measures of autonomy for many years, India was carefully managed to maximize
Britain’s benefit, and the other colonies were, in one way or another, controlled through
measures of “indirect rule.” In addition, the method by which any imperial sovereign
governs its colonial subjects can be assumed to have a critical formative influence on
nationalist movements. So, because the methods of governing are fundamentally
important, the British forms of colonial governance represent a necessary consideration in
any attempt to explain differences between each colony’s ideas of their nation. Hence,
Butler’s classification will be applied within this article to emphasize these essential
dissimilarities. In particular, each of the Dominions—South Africa, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand—will first be considered, as they achieved their independence at the
earliest dates. Following those examinations, the analysis will shift its focus toward the
Indian sub-continent and the movements that eventually created the modern countries of
India and Pakistan. In this way, I attempt to effectively provide an in depth comparison
without compromising a worldly perspective.
In order to execute this fusion, though, a second compromise must be made. In
almost every circumstance, the changing ideas of the nation birthed numerous nationalist
movements with a wide array for platforms. Of course, each of these movements
provides an opportunity for researchers to gain valuable information about the colonial
resistance movements that developed in opposition to the British. In fact, the prevalence
of multiple groups competing to institute their conception of the nation is one of the main
reasons that studies focusing on individual colonies are so valuable historically—close
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examinations can examine how and why one group or a few groups achieve(s)
recognition over others. However, to incorporate each of the examples effectively, many
of these groups must be excluded. Specifically, in each example colony, I will focus on
the activities of the major nationalist group(s), and especially the words of their leaders,
to isolate the ways in which groups that took the reins from the British envisioned the
nation. Because these movements successfully achieved independence, their
understanding of the nation must be relied upon as an important example of the changing
ideas of nation. Furthermore, this study seeks to compare successful movements as a
means of determining whether a common pattern toward independence can be found;
thus, peripheral groups, while useful for elaboration in more specific studies, are
extraneous to this examination and can be omitted. So, by relying on the rhetoric of
victorious nationalist movements, the specific examples allow us to circumvent (or at
least minimize) the prominent issues raised by employing the framework above, a benefit
which is well illustrated in the cases of the Dominions.
The Dominions
At the highest level of colonial status, the Dominions held a status that inspired
jealousy in other colonies. Of Great Britain’s colonies, the Dominions were allowed the
most autonomy because they were “colonies of white settlement … regarded as part of a
‘greater Britain’” settled by “agents of British civilization.” 14 In other words, as
“colonies of white settlement,” South Africa, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were
allowed large measures of internal autonomy, such as independently elected parliaments
which could pass laws and operated strictly internal affairs of the colony, because they
14

Johnson, British Imperialism, 59. Johnson served in the British Royal Army, attaining the rank of
Captain, before earning a PhD and becoming a professor of history at Warwick University in London,
England, where he continues research on British imperialism to this day.
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were composed of emigrant Britons. 15 However, it should be understood such measures
were not granted to the Dominions from the outset of their establishment. Actually, as
was often the case with the colonies, each Dominion started as a conglomerate of
unaffiliated ports, towns, and trading posts that gradually developed into individually
managed colonies, like New South Wales in Australia and Ontario in Canada. Finally, in
the second half of the nineteenth century, constituent states began to merge into singular
entities and eventually recognized a common, centralized government. 16 One historian,
Barbara Bush, puts forth that this “trusteeship” was based on and implied “the ‘divine
right’ of superior ‘Anglo-Saxons’ to rule the less civilized peoples” found in the
Dominions. 17 Undeniably, “such attitudes” on behalf of the British “endorsed white
settler rule and confirmed the imperial ‘colour bar’ dividing dependent non-white tropical
colonies,” such as India or the Gold Coast, “from self-governing ‘white Dominions’.” 18
Indeed, this consideration was a decisive determining factor in the establishment of the
overall imperial hierarchy of colonial status, most notably by warranting special
treatment for the Dominons.
Clearly, then, scholarly opinion maintains that “…Britain … paid more attention
to cooperation with the people … who populated” the white settler Dominions, which

15

The colonies of Ireland and Newfoundland also carried Dominion statuses at various times. Ireland has
been excluded from this investigation as scholars generally do not include it in discussions with the other
Dominions because it generally behaved in such drastically unique manners as to be considered entirely
distinct. For example, when other Dominions dutifully (albeit with often vocalized concerns) participated,
Ireland elected to remain neutral during World War II. Newfoundland has also been omitted because, after
attaining Dominion status in 1907, the Dominion forfeited its self-government and accepted direct British
colonial rule again in order to weather the hardships of the Depression, before being annexed into the
Canadian Dominion during World War II. Further discussion of the nature of Dominion status can be
found in Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War (London: Hambledon Continuum,
2006), xi; L.J. Butler, Britain and Empire, 1-6; Stewart, Empire Lost, viii-xi, 4, 5, 9-13.
16
Each individual unification process will be elaborate upon in more detail later.
17
Barbara Bush, Imperialism, Race, and Resistance: Africa and Britain, 1919-1945 (London: Routledge,
1999), 34. Bush is a professor of English and History at Sheffield Hallam University in Sheffield, UK.
18
Ibid.
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maintained a sense of good will between these colonies and the British government
during this period. 19 At the same time, though, while Britain allowed the white settler
communities to unify and to have measures of centralized, domestic self-government, it is
critical to remember that “self-government did not mean separation” and the British
government actively continued policies of settlement throughout this time as well. 20
Consequently, the continuous stream of incoming British immigrants nurtured a close
sense of kinship between Britons in both locations by steadily adding migrants born in
Britain, who thus perpetuated long established links to the British Empire. In other
words, the influx of immigrant Britons to the Dominions sustained a constant, visible
connection to British identities, even as they centralized throughout the mid- to late1800s. With the combination of Britain’s agreeable disposition and the incoming waves
of new settlers, it is unsurprising that these colonies held the closest ties to Great Britain.
Despite their bonds, however, the Dominions were the first of Britain’s imperial
possessions to be given their independence. Originally evolving without a clear
definition, the Dominion status was first articulated formally in public by the 1926
Balfour Declaration. Calling the Dominions “‘equal in status, in no way subordinate one
to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs … freely associated as
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations’,” the Balfour Declaration was an
improvement in the eyes of the Dominions, but held no technical legal power. And so,
by 1931, under continuing pressure, the British again accommodated the Dominions, as
the Statute of Westminster constitutionalized the status itself, ostensibly making the

19

Lloyd, Empire, 103. Lloyd is a retired history professor, previously tenured at the University of Toronto;
Empire was his last publication before retirement, though he remains an active participant in academia in
his retirement.
20
Johnson, British Imperialism, 62. For further details, see Johnson, British Imperialism, 59-74
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Dominions their own sovereign entities. 21 But how were the Dominions—the colonies
most connected to Britain itself—able to achieve such independence when acts of protest
were rarely met with such accommodation in other colonies? In these cases, critical
answers (or components of answers) lie in the relationships developing between the
Dominions and the British Empire during the First World War, the interwar period, and
the Second World War. Over the tumultuous years of 1910-1945, each colony developed
its own ideas of nation, at the expense of the British national identity that had been so
carefully cultivated throughout the nineteenth century. In each example, the colonies
developed a sense of unity and national sentiment that can be observed through the
framework and suggests that a pattern may exist that occurs no matter the context. This
trend toward independent self-images of the nation is perhaps most clearly demonstrated
in, South Africa.
South Africa
Largely populated by Dutch, Flemish, French, and German descended people—
known either as “Boers,” derived from the Dutch word for farmer, or as “Afrikaners,”
referring to the Afrikaans language they spoke — throughout much of the nineteenth
century, British influence in South Africa only began to increase during the 1820s when a
marked jump in Britons began relocating to the colony. While the region’s native
African inhabitants vastly outnumbered the European peoples, the Boer, or Afrikaner,
population in the area had established policies of slavery and exploitation from the early
stages of colonization. With the appearance of the liberalizing British influence (slavery
had been abolished in the Empire in 1833), the white settler populations frequently

21

Balfour Declaration, 1926, George 5, http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/resources/transcripts/cth11_doc
_1926.pdf (accessed April 23, 2010).
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clashed along topics of race relations as well as other topics. From the beginning, “the
Boers … viewed the British with suspicion” and were particularly “uneasy about British
expansion” in the region. 22 In fact, harboring fears of British oppression and traditions of
racial exploitation of Africans, many Boers relocated toward the interior of Southern
Africa in the middle of the century, creating the sovereign political states of the Transvaal
Republic (1852) and the Orange Free State (1854). As a result, the British were left as de
facto European controllers of the original coastal Cape Colony and, as such, initially
respected the Boers’ autonomy. Nonetheless, by the 1870s, the British had resolved to
form a South African confederation, to include the Boer Republics, on the model of the
Canadian colonies. Thus, in 1877, British forces invaded the Transvaal Republic, an
endeavor that ended in humiliating defeat for the British when the Boers rebelled in 1881,
forcing the British out of the country and re-establishing their independence. However,
with the discovery of vast deposits of mineral wealth in these Boer republics, especially
gold in the Transvaal in 1886, British expansionist interests were piqued again. Thus, in
1899, the British again invaded the Boer Republics, touching off the Boer War which
ended in British victory in 1902. Following the war, British migration to these colonies
spiked, with nearly 220,000 Britons relocating from 1901-10, up from just 76,000 in
1881-90. 23 In the words of historian Robert Johnson, the Empire’s “plan was to
accommodate the Boers, reconstruct the country economically and forge the unity
between Boers and British they had envisaged as early as 1877.” 24 This process
ultimately culminated in 1910 when the Transvaal Republic and Orange Free State (both
now under British administration) joined with the Cape Colony and Natal to officially
22

Johnson, British Imperialism, 71.
Johnson, British Imperialism, 63.
24
Ibid., 73.
23
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form the Union of South Africa. After its unification, South Africa was placed alongside
the other white settler communities within the British Empire under the “Dominion”
status. Despite appearances and South Africa’s technical unity, it is critically important
to recognize that deep-seated cleavages (Boer-British, European-African, etc.) had been
established within South African society, providing the cultural raw material on which a
distinctly South African historical tradition and experience could be constructed in the
nation’s imagination.
Indeed, a closer examination reveals that these schisms produced a background
that unmistakably aided the transition toward independence by distinguishing the South
African nation from that of the British Empire. In particular, as World War I opened,
South African public opinion was highly divided in 1914 between imperial patriotism and
outright opposition to the war, unsurprisingly along the British and Afrikaner division. 25
For example, Prime Minister Louis Botha and Defense Minister Jan Smuts believed “that
South Africa, as part of the Empire, was automatically at war.” 26 These former Boer War
generals turned British loyalists had anticipated full cooperation given their association to
the Afrikaners. 27 However, “nationalist-minded Afrikaners were outraged at being asked
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to take arms on the side of the British empire [sic], which as they saw it had so recently
unjustly destroyed the independence of their republics” in the Boer War. 28 As a result, “a
group of leading Boer generals declared themselves in favour of independence … and
launched a rebellion” shortly thereafter that Botha and Smuts quickly crushed in October,
with straggling fugitives surrendering as late as February 1915. 29 According to Hew
Strachan, the rebellion and speed of suppression were aimed at “forcing Boers to decide
where they stood.” 30 Additionally, Johnson said punishments for rebels “were lenient”
with “short” prison terms and no treason executions. 31 In many ways, the staunchest
opposition existed in the Parliament. Displeased with the South Africa Party’s support
for the war, a number of politicians separated to create the Nationalist Party “in 1914, on
a platform of Afrikaner nationalism, South African self-sufficiency and opposition to
participation in the ‘European war’….” 32 This party “raised a challenge to the imperial
connection and helped to foster that siege mentality which did so much to distort South
African politics in the decades that followed.” 33
Underscoring these disruptive developments, leading political figures of both the
Afrikaner and British groups bickered back and forth with each other throughout the war,
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particularly so in the first two years of the war. Though he did not participate in the
rebellion, General J.M.B. Hertzog—the main political representative of Afrikaner
opinion, a future Prime Minister of South Africa, and a veteran of the Boer War—openly
railed against imperialism. For instance, campaigning against further participation in the
war in the summer of 1915, Hertzog often repeated that “South Africa has done enough
for the Empire.” 34 From the British loyalist perspective, future Prime Minister, Jan
Smuts, retorted in August of 1915, “We want one South Africa, one united people,” later
claiming he would “work with my last breath for the good of South Africa,” in
cooperation with the British Empire. 35 Obviously, the two Boer generals held
dramatically differing opinions about South Africa’s role in the war.
However, while the various reactions of groups and leaders ostensibly indicate a
tumultuous society, the strength of the societal polarization actually showed that several
prerequisite changes to the ideas of nation were already occurring at this point. For
example, the past strife between Boers and British colonists provided a common (if
turbulent) historical past, an anti-British mentality (for the Boers, at least), and a cause
for loyalists to reach out to the Boers—the former two facilitating re-imaginations of the
nation and the latter emphasizing its boundaries. Similarly, the revolt and the formation
of the Nationalist Party evidenced of Boers’ belief that the British Empire did not
adequately—or never had—represent their interests. So, the Boers acknowledged the
divisions between their group’s aims and Britain’s, inspiring the officers and politicians
to act in opposition in their respective manners. This tacit acknowledgment and active
34
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pursuit of goals clearly complied with the expectations of the “limited” and “community”
prerequisites. Furthermore, the leniency extended toward the rebels after their revolt was
suppressed is indicative that the loyalists may have recognized the rebels as fellow
members of South Africa and, regardless, certainly did not desire to punish them to the
fullest extent of the law. This leniency thus was an overt shift away from long
established Afrikaner-British friction and contempt that hints at a change in the way the
groups “imagined” themselves, suggestive that the loyalists now included their former
antagonists within their identity or, at the very least, no longer viewed them as stark
enemies. Either way, the mercy exhibited by the loyalists insinuates that the groups’
ideas of inclusion and unity were changing, evocative of the “imagined” prerequisite.
Similarly, while Hertzog’s and Smuts’s statements offer opposite opinions of the war, the
rhetoric of both men referred to what South Africa should do as a single entity. These
prominent politicians were not appealing to Boers or Loyalists only, but to all of South
Africa. Hertzog and Smuts both identified with the Boer past and had conceived of
distinct South Africans, clearly supporting ideas of unity outlined in the “imagined”
prerequisite. What’s more, because both men repeatedly employed such rhetoric
throughout their careers, it is quite likely that the men not only represented a consensus of
their supporters (who would not have been supporters if they disagreed) but also
disseminated such ideas. In turn, these observations suggest that, though not allied with
each other per se, each group was acting and leaders were speaking on behalf of what
they believed to be the common best interests for South Africa, rather than Afrikaners or
British, as the “community” prerequisite would anticipate. As a result, it appears that,
less than a decade after their official political union, Afrikaners and British had begun to
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imagine themselves within a South African community larger than their respective
groups.
On the other hand, the two groups had yet to recognize their common interest in
World War I, which explains the total lack of appeals for constitutional reform. Perhaps
in deference to the war’s priority, no unified attempts toward the “sovereignty”
prerequisite’s characteristic constitutional reforms were made during the World War I
period in South Africa. Only the formation of the Nationalist Party, whose platform
specifically called for self-sufficiency and independence, hinted at future political efforts
toward reform. Once the war had ended, though, the temperate demeanor of South
African politicians changed dramatically. After their wartime contributions, grudging
though they were, both groups in South Africa believed they were justified to make
demands. 36 In particular, Hertzog was elected prime minister in 1924 on a platform
based heavily in the opinion that “it was vital that the Union’s membership … should be
the result of choice, not constraint.” 37 Therefore, in 1926, trying to appease post war
“pressure from within the Commonwealth, particularly from South Africa …, Britain
sought to clarify the meaning of Dominion status” with the Balfour Declaration. 38 The
document offered the following definition of Dominion status:
They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in
no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external
affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated
as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. 39
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As Butler proposes, this concession was, for Britain, intended as “a means of
strengthening [imperial bonds] by emphasizing the equality of Britain and the
Dominions.” 40 Yet, while the other Dominions approved of the Balfour Declaration’s
acknowledgment of their autonomy, South African politicians desired more. Hertzog
“wanted to go much further,” seeking “the right to amend their own constitutions
without” British involvement. 41 Writing to the British Secretary of State for the
Colonies, Leo Amery, Smuts articulated his belief that “the definition of Dominion status
in some formal manner had become overdue” and his resolve “for full Dominion
nationhood and independent status.” 42 Still, ever the loyalist, Smuts tempered his
opinion, saying “… but I equally recognize the value of the Empire as a whole and the
necessity of keeping it intact.” 43 Hertzog and Smuts, who recognized the potential
benefits for South Africa, came together and badgered the British government
unceasingly until the Statute of Westminster, “[a]n Act to give effect to certain
resolutions passed by Imperial Conferences held in the years 1926 and 1930,”
constitutionalized the Balfour Definition as well as guaranteed complete legislative and
executive autonomy. 44 Clearly, these activities constitute efforts to obtain sovereignty
over the historically envisioned national territory (as well as the final unifying power of
the process, allying Hertzog and Smuts); hence, the “sovereignty” prerequisite was
clearly fulfilled by South Africa. Overall, because the divisions within South African
society were so well-developed, it appears that conceptions of the nation were quickly
40
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transformed from associations with Afrikaner or British self-images toward singular,
unified identity by the common experiences under centralized government during the
World War I era.
Canada
Comparatively, ideas of a unified Canadian nation matured less rapidly than those
of South Africa. At the same time, the prerequisites do reveal changes quite similar to
those in South Africa and, by the 1931 signing of the Statute of Westminster, Canada was
voicing her desire for constitutional independence alongside her sister Dominion. Much
like South Africa, the Dominion of Canada consisted largely of two main groups of
people, French and British. While these two groups were far less antagonistic toward
each other than the Afrikaners and Boers originally were, the divisions created a
comparable scenario of divergent identities that came to conceive of themselves together
in Canada. Also reminiscent of the South African case, Canada’s development in the
nineteenth century was defined by “gradual consolidation. Four provinces had united
under the British North America Act in 1867” and were joined in 1870 and 1871 by the
provinces of Manitoba and British Columbia, respectively. 45 As British emigration
continued, “institutions had emerged to cater for the separate English and Frenchspeaking populations,” distinctly concentrated in their own provinces, most notably with
French speakers in Quebec. All the same, the unification process in Canada was
completed rather smoothly and the incorporation of two groups helped distinguish a new
Canadian history that, while not as volatile in South Africa, would be an important factor
in changing ideas in the future. As the First World War loomed on the horizon, “Canada
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remained a federal state despite unification,” with Canadians cognizant that London still
harbored “expectations of acquiescence in [their] centralised authority.” 46
Yet, the World War I period in Canada caused dramatic changes in the ways that
settlers in the Dominion considered their place in the British Empire. Unlike the reaction
in South Africa, Canada’s reaction was one of unified loyalty to Britain and the Empire at
the outset of World War I. Throughout the Dominion, a sense of voluntarism driven by
Canadian desires to “do their bit” and prove their value to the Empire rapidly created a
“patriotic consensus in English-speaking Canada.” 47 This voluntarism was seen in both
recruiting numbers, as “young Canadians were eager to enlist,” and financial donations
throughout the war, with the Canadian Patriotic Fund accruing some $47 million in 1919,
the last year of the war. 48 According to military historians Desmond Morton and J.L.
Granatstein, “Canadians, that August [1914], were united” as even Parliament called “a
party truce for as long as Canada was in danger” and “[d]issidents … agreed to hold their
tongues.” 49 This truce is important because the suggestion that “Canada was in danger”
discloses the proximity with which Canadians associated themselves with the British
nation, so closely that danger to England was synonymous with direct danger to Canada.
One Canadian parliamentarian was paraphrased as declaring “that Canada was of one
mind and one heart: supportive of Britain.”50 Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian prime
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minister, illustrated this sense of unified duty to Britain repeatedly too, often situating the
Dominion within the British Empire’s community quite clearly. In a speech delivered in
December 1914, Borden stated that “our citizens may be called out to defend our own
territory, but cannot be required to go beyond the seas except for the defence of Canada
itself … voluntarily the manhood of Canada stands ready to fight beyond the seas in this
just quarrel for the Empire and its liberties.” 51 Two weeks later, he proclaimed, “It is
hardly necessary to emphasize the unity of purpose which actuates the entire Empire in
this struggle.” 52 All of these factors certainly demonstrate a sense of unity, but the unity
was behind a British conception of the nation. However, as demonstrated in South
Africa, with this pre-existing unity in place, radical changes in perceptions of the nation
could occur at any time.
As the war persisted and casualties mounted, Canadians discovered that Britain
was not the perfect leader they had envisioned and, as reports of Canadian soldiers’
heroism trickled in, many began to acknowledge differences between British officers’
faults and their troops’ valor. As a result, many people began to recognize the war as
“Canadians’ baptism of fire, and they made a name for themselves,” internationally as
well as domestically. 53 By creating this impression, the conflict acted as a catalyst for the
transition from identification within the British Empire to viewing Canada as its own
group. In particular, people in Canada—especially the political leaders—soon
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recognized that their contributions to the war effort during and after “[the Second Battle
of] Ypres gave Canada a direct stake in a war the British seemed to be bungling.” 54
Naturally, the realizations that British commanders were sending Dominion troops into
bloodbaths shattered conceptions of the infallible British Empire and raised numerous
doubts about British control. As a result, it is unsurprising that by 1917, a time in which
“British forces were often portrayed as floundering in the mud,” portrayals of Canada’s
“elite shock troops … thrown into battle … to deliver victory time and time again”
became regular in Canada. 55 Further highlighting these doubts, Robert Borden
commented years later that “the chief constitutional question that arose related to the
sufficiency of Dominion legislation for the control and discipline of Canadian forces
overseas.” 56 Throughout the war, Borden adamantly pursued direct control of the
Canadian Expeditionary Force, an endeavor he found largely fruitless. Simultaneously,
as casualties mounted, writers publicized that “Canada’s sons have freely given their
lives to save us … with unabated courage and determination,” praising troops for “their
devotion and … spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice.” 57 This type of portrayal saturated
the Dominion’s print culture during the Great War. Repeated throughout the war, the
theme of dutiful sacrifice served “as the common bond of national identity” by
cultivating a sense of common hardship in the name of Canada, rather than the Empire. 58
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Undeniably, then, in both the political and public spheres, ideas of the nation had
certainly shifted toward a Canadian identity. Concerns about the quality of British
leadership evidenced the changes in several ways. First, Canadians were largely unified
in their understandings of themselves from the beginning of the war but their vision
arranged themselves loyally within the British Empire. However, the concerns with
British leadership facilitated the realization that British interests were not necessarily
synonymous with the concerns of Canadians. Hence, many Canadians became
disillusioned with the Empire and called for increased control of their troops abroad, most
notably demonstrated through Robert Borden’s objections. This recognition of disjointed
interests is indicative of the “limited” and “community” prerequisites. Moreover, unlike
South Africa, where the people needed no help recognizing their identity outside the
Empire, the war provided Canadians with an opportunity to build a reputation that
belonged solely to Canada. Coupled with the concerns over British leadership, the
resulting heroic images of Canadians in the field helped the Dominion’s citizens to build
a joint Canadian historical identity and thus to disconnect their unity from Britain,
thereby channeling their unification toward Canada itself under the “imagined”
prerequisite. In the end, for a colony consisting of large “English- and French-speaking
communities …, it is understandable that Canadians wanted to see the war as a common
sacrifice and the crucible of a national identity.” 59 However, Britain provided few
measures of control to Canada. Somewhat intuitively, Borden lamented in 1921 that
“[u]ntil the Dominions participate more fully and effectively in directing foreign policy
[sic] it is improbable that” continued cooperation within the Empire “will appeal strongly
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to their people.” 60 The years following the First World War would prove his observation
accurate.
In many ways, the interwar years represented the earliest origin of Canada’s
nationhood. After the British leadership’s gaffes in World War I, Canada had—in some
scholars’ opinions—become “so mature politically … that Canadian politicians …
largely jettisoned imperial issues as topics of debate” during the inter-war period. 61
Simultaneously, politicians grew progressively more vocal, likely in response to the new
national identity and disillusioned cynicism that developed toward Britain in World War
I. During this period, Canadian politicians—like Borden, William MacKenzie King, and
R.B. Bennett—“continued to push for a reappraisal of the constitutional relationship
between Britain and the dominions,” acting as a contributing catalyst for the Balfour
Declaration and Statue of Westminster. 62 Reflecting in his diary several years after the
Balfour Declaration, King especially resented British stonewalling, believing “…
Churchill & others did not like [the idea of division between] His Majesty Br. Govt. &
H.M. other Governments they wanted only H.M. govt. in England.” 63 The increased
political demands and King’s bitterness insinuates that Canadians had formulated their
own interests that the politicians were now expected to represent independently of British
control, achieving the “community” prerequisite. Furthermore, in securing their
autonomy constitutionally, Canada fulfilled the “sovereignty” prerequisite too.
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Curiously, even after the Statue of Westminster, Canadian politicians “remained
highly suspicious … about Britain’s intentions.” 64 Specifically, King, after being elected
prime minister, emerged as the greatest defender of Canadian autonomy within the
Commonwealth. As World War II loomed on the horizon, King’s “fear … that the war
would be used as a pretext to challenge the idea of Dominion autonomy” became quite
prolific. 65 Canada insisted “that its declaration of war” be viewed as “a Canadian, not an
imperial decision” and “was much more assertive in its military relationship with Britain
than were the antipodean Dominions”—demanding direct control of Canadian
contingents. 66 Even during the war, King harped on Canada’s choice to participate,
preaching that “Canada’s war effort is a voluntary effort. It is the free expression of a free
people … we entered the war of our own free will, and not as the result of any formal
obligation.” 67 Such a strong front from King likely served more to calm Canadian fears
that Britain would attempt to encroach upon the Dominion’s newfound independence,
and certainly shows that the processes in changing self-images did not simply start and
stop at any point; they were evolving movements with momentum that carried on beyond
the achievement of autonomy. Equally, Canada’s excursions in foreign policy, foremost
with the United States, likely reinforced both political confidence and “a sense of
independence that would not … be surrendered” after the war. 68 Clearly, then, Canada’s
initially unified sense of enthusiastic patriotism was transformed during World War I into
distrust of Britain’s leadership and a fledgling national identity. World War I made
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“Canadians … deeply conscious of a national identity … they no longer felt it necessary
to adopt without question usages, manners and behavior simply because they were
British.” 69 The First World War had “created a new sense that Canadians had done
something important together,” nurturing a sense of national identity and kick-starting a
process of nationalist evolution toward autonomy, comparable to South Africa’s, that
overcame previous divisions and matured during the interwar years with the Statute of
Westminster and continued to solidify through the Second World War. 70
Australia & New Zealand
For South Africa and Canada, Dominions with multiple large Europeandescended populations, the process of recognizing their distinct histories happened
rapidly because their citizenship and ensuing consolidation provided them with ready
supplied of non-British background. Comparatively, the Dominions of Australia and
New Zealand were heavily dominated by British settlers in terms of Europeans and
centralized into singular colonies later than either South Africa or Canada. For instance,
while Canadian provinces unified for the first time in 1867, Australians were still
establishing provinces as late as 1850 and 1859 in Victoria and Queensland, respectively.
This lag was further underscored by the fact that local self-government was not adopted
until 1856 in the various provinces, and that “New Zealand did not become a single state
until 1876 and Australia was unified only in 1901.” 71 Unsurprisingly, this tendency to
trail behind was repeated again in the changing conceptions of the nation, as Australia
and New Zealand largely followed in the footsteps of its sister Dominions from the First
World War onward.
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In the previous cases, at the time of World War I, changing perceptions of the
nation were rapid because South Africa and Canada each possessed mixed European
populations that, when amalgamated, distinguished them readily from their British
counterparts elsewhere. As a result, the unified identity(-ies) of each Dominion were
quickly detached from Britain because the roots of a unique history already existed by the
war era. However, in Australia and New Zealand, where the populations were almost
exclusively British immigrants, no such distinguishing characteristics were present. As a
result, when South African and Canadian notions of the nation were briskly transforming,
Australia and New Zealand initially lacked qualities that discerned them from Britain and
were thus fiercely loyal to the British. In fact, one scholar even proposed that early
nationalists believed that “…Australia itself had so short a white history … that it was not
thought a suitable medium to inculcate patriotism or national unity.” 72 Yet, the World
War I experience would fill that vacuum by creating a tradition on which to base
Australian and New Zealand history and unity. In Australia and New Zealand, the war
years were defined by the creation of unique identity—embodied in the ANZAC myth—
and its ensuing consolidation. In true white settler colony fashion, Australia and New
Zealand were wholeheartedly attached to the British nation initially; their people were
mostly British, emigration from Britain was continuing in large numbers, and the
populace fundamentally associated themselves with their British heritage with solidarity
unrivalled by other Dominions. From the war’s outset, the two Dominions were colonies
looking for greater recognition of their value within the larger Empire and therefore, as in
Canada, greeted Britain’s declarations of war in 1914 with great shows of imperial
patriotism. Citizens “hailed England’s declaration of war on Germany with the most
72
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complete and enthusiastic harmony in their history.” 73 In Australia, this loyalty was
furthermore demonstrated by the fact that “[a]ll of Australia’s troops were volunteers,
conscription having been rejected.” 74 Australians and New Zealanders clearly “hoped …
to see their country attain partnership status within the Empire” and showed their
enthusiasm while shouldering their share of the war’s burdens. 75 However, as the early
stages of the war passed, these attitudes began to change.
Much like the phenomenon in Canada, the staggering casualties absorbed in the
war shattered the Dominions’ blind faith in the British Empire, as stories of recurring
mistakes and blunders attributed to British military incompetency streamed into the
Dominion. Again mirroring Canada, images of the heroic soldiers of the Australian and
New Zealand Army Corps, or “ANZACs”, began to appear and the “myth of ANZAC”
became a major vehicle for national identity and disillusionment with Britain during the
war. In one scholar’s opinion, writers and politicians consciously cultivated the ANZAC
myth to replace the illusion of British invincibility by giving the ANZACs supposedly
unique, non-British qualities like ruggedness and egalitarianism. 76 The myth was first
conceived after the ANZACs participated in the disastrous Gallipoli campaigns, where
they were first exposed to poor British leadership at the expense of thousands of lives.
For example, one newspaper reported that British leadership had guided “the position of
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the troops” so poorly as “to be unique in military history. They possessed every possible
military defect, and were completely subjected to the artillery fire of the Turks … the
communications were insecure .... There was no means of concealing or of deploying
fresh troops ….” 77 After such portrayals of Gallipoli, the British were permanently
associated with military ineptitude and ANZAC soldiers came to resent the Brits for the
atrocious casualty rates throughout the war, as many developed “strong, often bitter, antiBritish feeling” during World War I. 78 As this image of British incompetence became
prominent, so, too, did portrayals of Australian and New Zealand heroism at Gallipoli.
Stories of ANZAC heroism strongly juxtaposed the portrayals of the British.
Recognizing the selling power, members of the Dominions’ press scrambled to
identify qualities that made the “ANZAC” so much superior to his British counterpart.
For instance, in the first few months of the Gallipoli campaign, The Brisbane Courier
reported that Turkish counterattacks were viciously repulsed “owing chiefly to the
gallantry and dash of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps … the troops have
inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.” 79 Echoing these sentiments, another writer wrote
of “the Anzac character, which to-day typifies the best that we know in dash, courage,
and grim determination … that sporting spirit” amongst the troops. 80 Soon, the
stereotypical ANZAC came to be known for utilitarianism, determination, egalitarianism,
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“mateship,” and other qualities supposedly instilled through rugged frontier lifestyles
only available in Australia and New Zealand. 81 Gallipoli had become “sacred soil …, the
ground of their nationhood, the origin and proof of their Imperial partnership.” 82 In the
Dominions, citizens reveled in their troops’ reputation for “courage, their manhood, and
their sheer dogged determination …” all the while taking the "greatest comfort from their
mates ….” 83 Australian Prime Minister William Hughes, during a visit to England to
commemorate the first ANZAC Day, offered the following to assembled ANZAC
veterans of Gallipoli and an assembled mass of British civilians:
We who knew them, who had lived their lives, who were steeped with them in
environment in which courage, resource, endurance, love of freedom, have been
for generations the common heritage of the people, we who had seen the resolute
and unfaltering strides with which the Australian people had set out to achieve
their destiny. … On the shining wings of your valour we were lifted up to heights
we had never seen; you taught us truths we never knew; you inspired us to a
newer and wider and nobler concept of life. … The deathless story of the
Gallipoli campaign will be sung in immortal verse inspiring us and generations of
Australians and New Zealanders, yet unborn, with pride of race, courage, tenacity
of purpose, endurance, and that casting out of fear … teaching us that through the
spirit of self-sacrifice alone can men or nations be saved. 84
Quite clearly, this passage defines the characteristics of ANZACs, positions the Gallipoli
story as the start of a purely Australian and New Zealand martial history, and alludes to a
national “destiny.” Taken with the press’s favor for descriptions of ANZACs, these
examples reveal the seminal role of the Gallipoli campaign and World War I in the
fulfillment of the “imagined” prerequisite as Australians and New Zealanders perceived
their own distinct national heritage, history, and characteristics for the first time.
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In addition to building a national history, their World War I experiences taught
Australians and New Zealanders “their own worth, which formerly they had doubted,
and” revealed “faults and cankers at the heart of their Empire, which once they had
imagined great above every imperfection.” 85 Still, while they undeniably possessed a
new, developed idea of their individual nations, Australia and New Zealand apparently
continued to believe their interests coincided with those of the British and sought
recognition within the Empire as a result. Despite the perceived blunders of the British
during World War I and the consequent disillusionment that had caused such political
uproar in South Africa and Canada alike, “there was little demand for change in
constitutional arrangements,” as “Australia and New Zealand did not adopt the
Westminster Statute until 1942 and 1947, respectively.” 86 This inactivity can largely be
attributed to the fact that the Australians and New Zealanders had yet to fully complete
the “limited” and “community” prerequisites, processes which began in the years
preceding World War II. To elaborate, as conflict loomed closer and closer, the
Dominions memories of World War I inspired great consternation that forced them to
reconsider their continued trust in the British in relation to their imagined nations’ best
interests. By early 1937, “… Australia and New Zealand were acutely aware that the
deteriorating situation in Europe would have implications for their own security,” and
Australia was particularly vocal about its concerns. 87 Still, both “Australia and New
Zealand took it for granted that they would enter the war as part of the empire” and
joined the war long before the Japanese threat materialized, as a “collapse of Britain
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would have been a disaster for them.” 88 Nevertheless, Britain “knew they would be
unable to support Australia.” 89 In fact, the situation grew so dire that British Dominions
Secretary Clement Atlee informed Australian Prime Minister John Curtin that Australia’s
and New Zealand’s “greatest support in this hour of peril must be drawn from the United
States.” 90 This prompted Curtin to reply that “Australia looks to America, free of any
pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.” 91 With their
“confidence in British protection shattered” by Atlee’s blunt statements and the collapse
of France, Australia and New Zealand were forced to seize control of their own defense,
which “resulted in much closer defence ties between Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States,” from which Britain’s relationships with its Dominions never fully
recovered. 92 These forays into foreign affairs diplomacy strengthened the confidence of
Australia’s and New Zealand’s politicians in their self-sufficiency and implied that the
Dominions had finally recognized and undertaken to pursue their personal interests,
surpassing the “limited” and “community” prerequisites.
If World War I was critical for establishing the ANZAC myth as a basis for
reimagining their nations, World War II drove Australia and New Zealand completely
away, as their wartime treaties had made it clear that “they would no longer accept the
British view of the post-war security system…,” and had become nearly self-reliant. 93
Indeed, the ratifications of the Statute of Westminster by Australia (1942) and New
Zealand (1947) combined with their independent management of war time defense and
88

Lloyd, Empire, 162; Jackson, British Empire, 471.
Johnson, British Imperialism, 182.
90
Clement Atlee, quoted in Johnson, British Imperialism, 182.
91
John Curtin, quoted in Ibid.
92
Butler, Britain and Empire, 38.
93
Stewart, Empire Lost, 115. Stewart referred to treaties signed with the United States and between the two
Dominions. Most notably, he cited the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty
and Australian-New Zealand Agreement as evidence.
89

36

foreign affairs highlighted that neither Dominion trusted British leadership to represent
their concerns and acted in their own interests. As a result, the Second World War
precipitated the changes in the Dominions’ ideas of the “nation” that had been forestalled
by continued loyalty in the interwar years. However, Australia and New Zealand were
notable in that the changes were slower in coming than in South Africa and Canada,
almost to the point of having been forced upon them. For instance, acknowledgment of
the disconnect between British and Australian/New Zealander’s interests was forced by
the Atlee-Curtin exchange, even though Australia and New Zealand had desired further
collaboration. Suddenly pushed to assess their situation with newfound realism, the
Dominions had no alternative other than to recognize the unavoidable split in defense
priorities. In turn, the denial of significant British support forced the Australians and
New Zealanders into the realm of foreign affairs, resulting in several defense pacts with
each other and the United States. These negotiation and signing processes were
conducted completely independent of the British government and gave critical experience
to politicians from both Dominions while building confidence in their own self-reliance
under the “community” prerequisite. By the end of the war, one scholar described
“Australia’s attitude to Empire” as “love and community on the one hand … frustration
… on the other.” 94 Lastly, the “sovereignty” prerequisite was finally realized in Australia
and New Zealand when each Dominion ratified the Statute of Westminster, a change they
had refused to make prior to World War II. Already acting independently during the war,
the Dominions fittingly completed the transition to autonomous nationhood almost as an
afterthought, years later than their sister Dominions.
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Ultimately, then, Britain’s inability to assist in the defense of Australia and New
Zealand had destroyed any remnant faith in the British Empire, consolidated their ideas
of independence, enhanced their confidence in their foreign affairs abilities, and created
closer ties to the United States. All of these factors contributed to the realization of
national identity in Australia and New Zealand. Liz Reed summarized the general
opinion nicely, saying World War I provided the means by which a national identity
“could be ‘imagined’ by the generations who followed.” 95 Furthermore, World War II
was “a time in which the national identity, traceable to … Gallipoli, was consolidated” by
soldiers who “in the spirit of the Anzacs, fought and saved Australia.” 96 Tellingly, to the
exclusion of other catalysts for identity, “Australia and New Zealand are …the only
countries in the world whose most popular national day commemorates the death of
citizens in a war fought abroad,” strongly emphasizing the battle’s importance with their
historical tradition. 97 With Australia and New Zealand cementing their autonomy late in
World War II, some scholars attest that Britain’s “victory came at a price: a loss of
prestige, … and ultimately, the acceleration of the process of decolonization.” 98 The
“story of Anzac,” when combined with “events during the Second World War,” meant
that “the days of Empire in Australia were numbered.” 99 Similarly, when considered
together, each Dominion’s example hints at a pattern of transitioning ideas and strong
final unifying tendencies, as even the least divided populations of Australia and New
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Zealand became closely tied through the shared ANZAC tradition. Yet, by rule, Britain
intended to withhold autonomy from colonies other than the Dominions in the years after
World War II. Of course, no rule is without exceptions and, in this case, the British
Empire would make an especially large exception indeed: by 1947, the “jewel” of the
Empire would be partitioned into the autonomous states of India and Pakistan.
India & Pakistan
In the entirety of the British Empire, no colony was more valued than India under
the British Raj. Encompassing, among others, the modern day states of India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and portions of Myanmar, British India was the foundation of the Empire’s
international influence. India provided the British Empire with seemingly bottomless
reserves of manpower, a vastly profitable trade center full of products and huge markets
for exploitation, and a hub from which to operate a system of sub-imperialism in
Southeast Asia. The obvious, irrefutable value of the colony had wide-ranging effects
upon the relationship between the Empire and India that, in turn, fundamentally affected
the dynamics of changing national perceptions. Most prominently, as the jewel of the
Empire, India occupied its own tier of status between the Dominions and the remaining
“dependent” colonies. To elaborate, Indians were allowed to maintain representative
groups like the Indian National Congress and, later, the Muslim League, which
articulated their desires to the British through resolutions and political activities. Despite
these institutions, final decision making powers were vested in the British viceroy, who
oversaw all activities in British India and possessed overall approval and veto abilities,
severely restricting the abilities of Indians to effect changes of their own. In turn, these
restrictions caused considerable friction between the Indian population and the British,
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periodically erupting into massive protest or violent unrest. Additionally, the sheer size
of the Raj meant that numerous minority groups presented many cleavages within the
colony, including divisions derived from the Hindu caste system. Nevertheless, changing
perceptions of the nation again acted as a unifying stimulus. Unlike the scenarios in the
Dominions, though, the pattern in Indian society would not produce a single national
identity, but multiple. Above all, the religious divisions between the Hindu majority and
the large Muslim minority that was highly concentrated in regions like the Punjab and
Bengal came to dominate Indian political life by the time India was awarded its
independence in 1947. Fittingly, these divisions were the greatest determining factor in
the eventual political fate of the Indian subcontinent, resulting in its ultimate partition —
against Britain’s steadfast objections—into the modern political states of India and
Pakistan.
To understand this process, though, a preliminary understanding of British
involvement in the subcontinent is necessary first. Under the influence of the British East
India Company from as early as the seventeenth century, India was originally controlled
through the Company’s policy of “divide and rule,” which sought to exploit the preexisting social and religious cleavages. By maintaining these differences, the British East
India Company prevented major unified opposition very effectively. Nonetheless, by the
1850s, Indians had grown restless and, after a string of violent protests culminating in the
Indian Rebellion of 1857, British imperial troops were called in to re-establish order
alongside the Company’s troops. Recognizing the potentially disastrous implications of
prolonged political upheaval in the colony, the British government officially brought
India into the Empire following their intervention, ushering in the era of the British Raj.
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After the transfer, the British ruled through the station of the British viceroy, who directly
presided over the Company’s former territories, while instituting indirect rule through the
Indian princely states. With this system, the British achieved direct control, allowing
them to minimize the extent of unrest (which was still prevalent) in the colony up to the
start of the First World War. 100
For India, involvement in the World Wars radically changed the domestic
political topography and the relationship between the colony and the Empire. While the
relationship between the Empire and the Indian colony had always been tumultuous, the
First World War instilled a sense of distrust toward the imperial sovereign that had
previously been lacking. In doing so, the war drastically worsened the British-Indian
relationship by eliminating any faith Indians reposed in the British and encouraging
cooperation between Indians in spite of the subdivisions in their culture. At the
beginning of the war, “modern emancipation movements … were taking shape, bringing
to an end both the pre-nationalist opposition of those in power before colonization, and
the more or less willing acceptance of colonial domination by a new elite.” 101
Nonetheless, much like the reactions seen in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand,
100

This brief overview is drawn from several sources. Primarily, information was taken from Lloyd,
Empire, 89-96, 133-40. For a more detailed discussion of the administration of the British East India
Company, see Johnson, British Imperialism, 24-38. It should be noted that throughout the period discussed
in this paper, unrest was essentially a constant reality of Indian politics. For the sake of brevity, many
transgressions have been overlooked. For more specific examples of such social upheavals during the First
World War years, see Upendra Chakravorty, Indian Nationalism and the First World War 1914-18 (Recent
Political & Economic History of India) (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1997), 253-69; for examples
from the inter-war years, see Tim Moreman, “‘Watch and Ward’: The Army in India and the North-West
Frontier, 1920-39,” in Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700-1964,
edited by David Killingray and David Omissi (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999), 13742, 146-51; or Allen Merriam, Gandhi vs. Jinnah: The Debate Over the Partition of India (Columbia, MO:
South Asia Books, 1980), 18-9; and for Second World War unrest, see Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper,
Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University, 2005), 25-6, 42-5,67-8.
101
Rudolf von Albertini, “The Impact of the Two World Wars on the Decline of Colonialism,” in The End
of the European Empire: Decolonization after World War I, ed. Tony Smith (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath
& Company, 1975), 4.

41

Indians greeted the declaration of war with widespread “manifestations of loyalty and
readiness to give” assistance to the war effort. 102 However, India’s contributions were
not based on a pure sense of imperial voluntarism or on desires to prove themselves
worthy of imperial partnership, as was the case in those Dominions. Instead, Indian
cooperation was grounded in their own hopes for autonomy from the very beginning, as
many Indians “believed that the Empire would give India home rule” if they cooperated
with the British effort and, under this logic, many Indians believed “the Empire must
therefore be saved.” 103 In one member of the Congress’s words, “the condition of India’s
usefulness to the Empire is India’s freedom.” 104 Returning to India from South Africa in
1915, Mohandas Gandhi commented that India’s “freedom is situated on French soil … If
we could but crowd the battlefields of France with an indomitable army of Home Rulers
fighting for victory for the cause of the allies [sic], it would also be a fight for our
cause.” 105
These statements reveal important insights into the Indian understanding of their
place within the Empire and of their ideas of nationhood. Differing significantly from the
‘white settler’ Dominions, Indians had already “imagined” their group separately from
the British prior the First World War. For a number of reasons, this difference is
unsurprising: Indians lacked the basic connection to Britain as a result of continued
settlement, practiced different religions, were already conscious of their “ancient
history,” and were unavoidably differentiated racially. 106 Yet, on the other hand, the
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“limited” and “community” prerequisites were a different matter altogether. While
members of the Indian National Congress frequently stressed that their participation in
the war effort came with expectations of reward, the British government exacerbated the
situation by encouraging optimism in the Indian nationalists with ambiguous policy.
Above all, Edwin Montagu’s speech in the British House of Commons inspired great
hopes for Indians, when he claimed the “policy of His Majesty’s Government is the
gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive
realisation of responsible government in India as part of the Empire.” 107 Montagu’s use
of the terms “gradual development,” “progressive realisation,” and “responsible
government,” while ostensibly quite reassuring to Indians, are noticeably vague in terms
of implementation. Consequently, as Gandhi’s statement revealed, many nationalists (or
“Home Rulers”) still believed that Britain’s overall goals coincided with theirs and thus
promoted cooperation with the British war effort as a means of achieving both groups’
aims. Therefore, Indians cannot be said to have fulfilled the “limited” or “community”
prerequisites, as they perceived a lingering unity of interests with the British Empire
and—much as Australia and New Zealand after the war—continued to pursue common
ends, trusting in the British to make good their seemingly benevolent promises.
Unfortunately for them, their trust in British intentions was misplaced, as the ambiguity
of British rhetoric proved to be the undoing of their lofty hopes.
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Nevertheless, still unaware of the divergence between Britain’s intent and their
own hopes, Indian politicians remained supportive of the recruitment efforts throughout
the war. Over the course of the war, the Indians not only furnished massive numbers of
troops, but had also “paid the cost of providing a million men to fight for Britain,” a
gesture unique to India’s war contributions. 108 As a result, as late as 1919, Indians
remained optimistic, expecting significant changes to the structure of imperial
government in India. In that year, two significant events occurred that irreparably
disillusioned the formerly cooperative Indians, just as World War I had disillusioned the
Dominions, and set the tone for Indian politics in the interwar years. First, instead of
receiving the measures of autonomous control they anticipated, Indians were rewarded
for their wartime contributions by the 1919 Government of India Act, which pioneered
the system of dyarchy. Under the system of dyarchy, “Indians were given a considerable
role in government at a provincial level” over comparably peripheral areas like education,
agriculture, and public health, “leaving Britain responsible for central government, above
all for those areas such as security and finance, which reinforced the existence of the Raj”
rather than weakening it. 109 Therefore, these policies that the British viewed as
concessions were received with outrage by many members of the INC, prompting a
number of congressmen, most importantly Mohammed Ali Jinnah, to leave the
Legislative Council in protest. Worse yet, the Indians were destined to be shockingly
disappointed by the British again.
The second devastating event occurred in April 1919: the Amritsar Massacre,
named for the town in the Punjab in which it occurred. Initially an organized protest
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against recent arrests and mistreatment by the British, the amassed Indians eventually
escalated into a violent mob, looting and burning banks and shops. In the process, three
Englishmen were murdered and two women were assaulted. Attempting to restore order,
British troops moved into the town under the command of General Reginald Dyer and
established marshal law. Several days later, Dyer and his contingent marched throughout
the town reading a proclamation that deemed any meeting of more than four males to be
an unlawful assembly that would be dispersed by force, if declared necessary. Later that
afternoon, at the Jallianwala Bagh (Amritsar’s principal meeting grounds), a religious
festival was taking place to mark Baisakhi, the opening of a Sikh religious festival.
Marching a column of troops into position on an embankment overlooking the recessed
gathering area, Dyer commanded his men to open fire, resulting in some 380 civilians
deaths. No one ordered the crowd to disperse or any warning at all. Worsening the
situation, after the shooting started, the crowd of thousands rushed to evacuate the area
through the three narrow roads leading into the area and created a gridlock in which
numerous people were injured and trampled as well as targeted by the soldiers.
Justifying his orders, Dyer later reported that “my force was small and to hesitate might
induce attack. I immediately opened fire and dispersed the mob. … My party fired 1650
rounds.” 110 After the Massacre, the British government could have defused the situation
by punishing Dyer appropriately for his shortsighted brutality, but instead “the British
saw this as a praiseworthy pre-emptive measure to maintain law and order, whatever the

110

Lapping, End of Empire, 38. This narrative of the Amritsar Massacre is paraphrased from Lapping, End
of Empire, 37-8. Additional information can be found in Lloyd, Empire, 150-1. Bayly and Harper,
Forgotten Armies, 278, 373 offers examples of how the Amritsar Massacre was used by groups other than
the Congress in propaganda designed to incite violent resistance to the British as late as the Second World
War.

45

cost,” understandably infuriating Indians across the colony. 111 For obvious reasons,
Indians were furious and, when taken with Britain’s apparent intransigence in terms of
political concessions, began to seek their own solutions.
Much like effects of disastrous British leadership for the Dominions’ perceptions,
these events were critical in the transition of national thought in colonial India toward
nationalist identity during the interwar years. After 1919, Indians had lost all confidence
in the British government’s promises of gradual reform, shattering their misconceptions
of common interests. In the eyes of Indians, the 1919 Government of India Act had
exposed Britain’s true intentions for India: retain as much control for as a long as
possible regardless of Indian cooperation. Furthermore, the Amritsar Massacre
undeniably demarcated the British as outside the boundaries of the Indian nation under
the “limited” prerequisite, since the British applauded an outright atrocity as an
acceptable, even integral, part of maintaining imperial control. In the wake of these
revelations, Indian “[n]ationalist organizations and parties began to demand … a
relaxation of authoritarian rule and an increasing share in government and administration.
… excessive paternalism … was rewarded by demonstrations and acts of sabotage.” 112
Politicians who had vocally promoted the British war effort felt especially scorned. In
particular, Gandhi was deeply offended. Reflecting upon his former stance of
cooperation as a means to gain concessions from the British, Gandhi lamented that he
“clung to British rule because, in my ignorance, I attributed to it strength for undertaking
the great task of smashing this civilization. But now I see that British rule is perhaps
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more Satanic than what Germany does.” 113 Though he immediately backpedalled from
his comparison, the fact that Gandhi even ventured to compare Germany—still embattled
with negative connotations as a result of the First World War—and Britain is revealing of
the deep sense of distrust and betrayal that he felt after the Empire reneged on their
promises. Undeniably, “the Amritsar Massacre of 1919 disillusioned Indians about
British intentions,” creating an environment of frustration among Indian politicians and
people. 114
So, in a period when the white Dominions were receiving constitutionally
supported independence in the 1926 Balfour Declaration and the 1931 Statute of
Westminster, India was radicalizing politically. The events of 1919 had, in the minds of
Indian politicians, drawn the “line in the sand” and more radical changes to the ideas of
the nation began to occur in the 1920s. For instance, whereas each of the Dominions had
undergone unification processes prior to changing their ideas of the nation, India did not.
First of all, because the regions defined by the British were largely foreign constructs
established in the nineteenth century, the Indians themselves associated themselves with
the regions as much (or as little) as they did with the nation. As Sunil Khilnani
explained, in India, “a sense of region and nation emerged together, through parallel selfdefinitions,” which contributed to the “distinctive, layered character of Indianness.” 115
Because “regional identity only came into being as people tried to define a large ‘Indian’
community,” the two identities (regional and national) were generally not seen as
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contradictory, but rather as corresponding parts of each other. 116 As a result, the regional
and ethnic unifications that were necessary in the Dominions did not occur in India.
However, while the potential problems of regional divisions were avoided, Indian
nationalism would experience a significant divergence, unseen in the Dominions, based
on religion.
The interwar years in India were critically important to the Indian nationalist
movement because, in the wake of the events of 1919, the developing movement split
along religious cleavages, eventually evolving into two large, religo-nationalist
groupings, a conversion in which the role of nationalist leaders cannot be overstated.
Specifically, nationalism in India “developed strong religious and cultural elements”
along Hindu and Muslim divisions that affected the ways people revised their ideas of
nation. 117 The first step in the emergence of religion as a nationalist fault-line was the reemergence of the Muslim League under Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the former Congress
member who had vacated his seat in protest of the 1919 Government of India Act.
Having joined the Muslim League in 1913 while still a member of the INC, Jinnah’s
departure from the Congress allowed him to focus his political life on the League
exclusively. Over the course of the 1920s, Jinnah campaigned for legal protections of
minority rights, specifically for Muslims, who comprised approximately a quarter of the
population. During this time in the mold of a true lawyer, Jinnah believed that minority
groups could achieve security for themselves through legal and constitutional processes
in collaboration with the Congress after achieving independence from Britain. However,
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Jinnah’s crusade for minority protections highlighted the disparities between the two
religious groups and the League’s emergence made religion an inherent part of national
definitions because by openly restricting membership to only Muslims. Nonetheless, for
the time being, the two groups’ upper echelon politicians saw the potential benefits of
collaboration.
Indeed, although religion determined the limits of the nation for Gandhi and
Jinnah, this fact did not initially imply to the two nationalist groups that they pursued
different goals. In actuality, they viewed the British as their common opponents and thus
originally cooperated, reminiscent of the cooperation between Hertzog and Smuts to
pursue South Africa’s interests, which took precedent over their respective party
affiliations. In this case, though, Gandhi’s and Jinnah’s suggests that their perceptions of
their separate communities were underdeveloped and suggests in the framework that the
Indian nationalists still believed in their overall unity, while recognizing the disconnect
from the Empire. After all, like the Boers and British in South Africa, both groups
ultimately wanted independence from the Empire and might have ended up within a
unified state too. Even so, each group conceived of their nation in slightly different ways
that would become entrenched in their psyches. For example, to Gandhi and his
followers, the final national interest was independence from Britain, to be achieved
through inclusion of both Muslims and Hindus within a united India. Writing in 1929,
tired of British intransigence in awarding India the Dominion status, Gandhi stated that
“the unexpectedly unanimous Indian demand,” put to the British was “now Complete
Independence.” 118 Throughout the rest of his political life, Gandhi emphasized
“communal unity, which is as dear to me as life itself,” as a fundamental aspect of his
118

Mohandas Gandhi, “An Englishman’s Dilemma,” April 4, 1931, in Green, Gandhi in India, 145.

49

rhetoric, believing that India’s greatest strength could be achieved through unity despite
its great diversity and the defined religious groups. 119
Similarly, Jinnah’s conception of the nation at this time was steeped in religious
terminology, but religious differences did not inherently preclude broader cooperation
with Hindu Indians. He held the opinion that the “essential requisite condition to achieve
Swaraj is the political unity between Hindus and Muslims.” 120 In reality, then, Jinnah’s
words indicated similar intent for the Muslim nation in 1928 as he claimed “… there is no
progress for India until the Mussalmans and the Hindus are united, and let not logic,
philosophy, or squabble stand in the way of coming to a compromise and nothing will
make me more happy than to see a Hindu-Muslim union.” 121 Reiterating this sentiment
in April 1936, Jinnah observed that “eighty million Muslims of India are willing and even
more anxious … to fight for the freedom of mother India, hand in hand with other
communalities.” 122 Without a doubt, while the groups understood the boundaries
between their groups along religious terms, the Muslim League and INC each saw their
community’s interests as analogous. The continued ideas of communal interests indicate
that, at this time, the third and fourth prerequisites had yet to be realized and suggested
that Indian nationalism took priority to religious loyalties. In fact, Jinnah summarized the
viewpoint concisely in 1934, saying “I am an Indian first, and a Muslim afterwards.” 123
However, much as the events of 1919 had incited radical changes, so too would those of
1935.
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In the meantime, despite the nationalists’ cooperation with each other, the British
continued to stifle Indian nationalist appeals. Through the 1920s and 30s, the two sides
played something of a game of cat and mouse: the Indians would demand concessions,
the British would stonewall before desperately attempting to mitigate the damage, but it
would be too late and the Indians would increase their demands. To illustrate, in 1929,
the British viceroy, Lord Irwin, announced that Britain’s ultimate aim in India was to
establish Dominion status; however, by that time, Indian nationalists had largely
abandoned demands for raised status which had occupied much of the decade and
replaced them with calls for complete independence. Then, the British made another
effort to placate the Indians that changed everything. Intended to appease the nationalists
(again), the Government of India Act of 1935 built upon the reforms of 1919, “by
extending dyarchy to full provincial self-government.” 124 The new act also contained a
framework by which the Indian provinces and princely states could be united into a
federation. Expecting this process of consolidation to be a lengthy, complex affair, the
British sought to prolong their control, enabling them to protect the colony’s minorities
(their greatest concern in public) and maintain key positions of power, “while nationalism
would be distracted by the opportunities created by provincial self-government.” 125
While this intent was not lost on him, Gandhi supported the Act as a means of increasing
the numbers of Indians involved with government, assuming they would operate free of
British influence, and providing a forum for Muslims and Hindus to coexist within the
government. In 1937, amidst widespread debate “over whether congressmen should
stand for election” to the new positions, “Gandhi surprised his followers by favoring such
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candidacy.” 126 However, Gandhi’s hopes for cooperation would ultimately be
disappointed.
In spite of Gandhi’s hopes for amelioration, the 1935 Government of India Act
eventually drove a wedge further between the Muslim League and other nationalists. In
fact, the elections of 1937 were pivotal in hardening the Muslim League’s desires for
partition by eliminating any desires to cooperate with the INC. During the elections,
many Muslim League and Congress candidates ran in the elections, but “the Muslim
League did poorly in winning only 4.6% of the vote” while the INC candidates won
many of their seats. 127 In the aftermath of their disappointing showing, Jinnah repeatedly
approached the Congress to secure participation in the provincial ministries for nonCongress Muslims, but was denied each time. The landslide success of the Congress had
instilled a keen sense of self-confidence in Nehru and other congressmen. Believing their
political position secure, the INC rejected opportunities to accommodate the Muslim
League, setting in motion the chain of events that culminated in the creation of Pakistan.
Summing up the effect, S.K. Majumdar posited that, “had the Congress handled the
League more tactfully after the elections, Pakistan might never have come into being …
Jinnah certainly created Pakistan. But the Congress by its sins of omission and
commission also helped to make it possible.” 128 This rejection was the single greatest
catalyst for Pakistan’s “community” prerequisite. Afterwards, Jinnah and the League
emphasized the divergences between their interests and those of the INC, precipitating a
second shift in the understandings of the League’s national self-image that was entirely

126

Green, Gandhi in India, 240.
Merriam, Gandhi vs. Jinnah, 56.
128
Majumdar, S. K., Jinnah and Gandhi: Their Role in India’s Quest for Freedom (Calcutta: K.L.
Mukhopadhyay, 1966), 163.
127

52

unique to India as opposed to the Dominions. The Congress’s steadfast denial of
Jinnah’s requests made it painfully clear that, in Jinnah’s opinion, the INC only truly
desired to further its own cause, rather than pursuing the common best interests of all
Indians. Consequently, after this point, the Muslim League and Jinnah in particular grew
increasingly disinterested in any system that could potentially render them subject to the
Hindu majority that had denied their calls for coalition. By rejecting them, the INC had
tried to “drive the League into political wilderness, but” instead Nehru’s party
inadvertently helped “to strengthen Jinnah’s hands as the foremost champion of Muslim
claims and rights.” 129 With this seismic realignment, the Muslim League now had two
enemies against which to juxtapose their national boundaries, the British as well as the
Indian National Congress, and Jinnah prominently emphasized those boundaries. In turn,
Jinnah’s radical reversal directly altered the previously unified path of Muslims and
Hindus by rallying the groups to religious affiliations and away from the ideas of a
unified Indian nation, like those achieved in South Africa and Canada prior to autonomy.
Thus, Jinnah’s changing outlook attests to the centrality of nationalist leaders within their
movements by showing how quickly radical alterations can be implemented.
This shift in mentality was clearly visible as early as October of 1937, as Jinnah
quickly adopted religo-political rhetoric designed to unify Muslim support behind the
League. Indeed, Jinnah’s new rhetoric appeared as early as his annual Presidential
Address for the Muslim League’s 1937 session, in which he blasted the Congress for
“alienating the Mussalmans of India … by pursuing a policy which is exclusively
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Hindu.” 130 Later in the speech, Jinnah urged Muslims to “establish your solidarity and
complete unity,” arguing that only “a well-knit, solid, organised, united force can face
any danger.” 131 His repeated references to organization, unity, and solidarity are obvious
attempts to bring together Muslim support behind his party, an effort designed to allow
the Muslim League to challenge what Jinnah believed to be the Hindu dominated INC.
While he had not yet begun to call for partition, Jinnah’s mental shift was very clear.
The League had already viewed their nation as restricted to Muslims only, but had
formerly observed a sense of shared interests with other Indians in their desires for
independence from the British Empire. Now angered by the INC’s rejection, the League
perceived that the INC did not seek to accommodate the League’s interests. As a result,
the League began to purely pursue their personal interests and unity under the aegis of
Islam, independently fulfilling the “community” prerequisite and now fully constituting a
separate fledgling nation. Therefore, what on the surface was a division in Indian
nationalists, the League’s new position actually buttresses the unifying tendencies first
observed in the Dominion. However, while simultaneously stressing the effect leadership
can have in consciously guiding and shaping that unity, in light of the Dominion
examples, the dramatic reversal of position toward divisive politics orchestrated by
Jinnah appears to have been an exception rather than the rule in perceptions of the nation
promoted by successful movements.
Throughout the rest of the interwar era, both the INC and Muslim League
continued to gather support around their parties and each grew increasingly disinterested
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in cooperation with the other. Gandhi continued to preach the importance of non-violent
cooperation and the League, under Jinnah’s guidance, grew increasingly antagonistic
with their rhetoric. It was during this time that Gandhi came to be associated as the INC’s
leader, largely as a result of Jinnah’s propagandizing. For instance, in his 1938
Presidential Address before the Muslim League, Jinnah attacked the Congress as
“nothing but a Hindu body” intoxicated with its power and Gandhi as “responsible for
turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism and for the
establishment of Hindu Raj in India.” 132 Clearly, in little over a year, the League, with
Jinnah as the main catalyst, had evolved a new view of the nation that defined both
British and Hindu (represented by the INC) interests as oppositional to their own. So,
much like the events of 1919 had forced Indians to recognize the divergences between
their interests and those of the British, the 1937 election emphasized the difference of
interests between the INC and Muslim League, resulting in the League’s first
independent pursuits of their interests, thus completing the “community” prerequisite for
the Muslims. It would be another ten long years before either group would fulfill the
“sovereignty” prerequisite.
Now that the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League openly competing
against each other as well as the British, the political scene in India became more
complex and progressively more volatile. Notwithstanding the social instability, it took
an experience as traumatic as the Second World War to finally set in motion the
departure of the British from India. After the British declared war on Germany in 1939,
the viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, notoriously announced without consulting either the
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Congress or Muslim League that, as a dependency in the British Empire, India was now
at war. Naturally, members of Congress were incensed by the humiliating rebuke and
their response was expectedly swift and furious, as they “demanded to be included in
central government, and when this was denied, the Congress provincial ministries
resigned in protest.” 133 Recognizing the potential political benefit for Muslims, Jinnah
“sought to turn the British-Congress cleavage to his own advantage” by avoiding open
denunciations of the war effort and even “hinting support for the war effort.” 134 These
different reactions to the declaration of war further highlighted the differences between
the two groups. The INC’s actions indicate their primary concern for Indian
independence, while the Muslim League’s alternative approach, designed to garner
leverage that could insure Muslim rights, reiterated that independence was secondary and
only acceptable if accompanied by protective measures, thus highlighting the differing
platforms and visions of the two groups. Soon, Jinnah’s shrewd political maneuvering
produced leverage that would blossom into full-blown demands for a separate, partitioned
Muslim state.
On March 22, 1940, Mohammad Jinnah delivered his Presidential Address to the
Muslim League in the Lahore session and, for the first time, articulated his desires to see
Hindus and Muslims partitioned into separate independent states. The speech employed
rhetoric that echoed the three prerequisites and was the first step toward final sovereignty
for the League. In his speech, Jinnah declared that “Muslim India is now conscious” and
“we are now … very apprehensive and can trust nobody,” reminiscent of the imagined,
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limited, and community prerequisites while emphasizing internal cohesion. 135 Two days
earlier, on March 20, Gandhi had published a statement in the most recent issue of
Harijan, in which he had referred to Jinnah as “my brother” in another appeal for
overarching Indian unity. 136 Two days later, during his address, Jinnah joked about the
comment, saying that the “only difference is this, that brother Gandhi has three votes and
I have only one vote,” a criticism proposing Gandhi and other Hindus held more sway
with the British than did Jinnah. The jab might also be interpreted as an accusation that
the Congress was only interested in cooperating with the Muslims in order to achieve an
independent government because the Hindus were aware that their majority could
subjugate the Muslims through a Constituent Assembly. 137 Either way, the most critical
passage was yet to come, and it proved to be one of the most influential passages in the
era. Jinnah continued that
[t]he problem in India is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an
international one, and it must be treated as such. So long as basic and
fundamental truth is not realized, any constitution that may be built will result in
disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the Mussalmans but to
the British and Hindus also. … the only course open to us all is to allow the
major nations separate homelands by dividing India into ‘autonomous national
states’….
… our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact,
different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims
can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian
nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of your troubles …
The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social
customs, literatures … neither intermarry nor interdine together and … belong to
two different civilizations … To yoke together two such nations under a single
state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to
growing discontent and final destruction …. 138
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The pattern for Jinnah’s rhetoric over the next seven years is laid bare in this passage
that, in 1940, was met with a thunderous ovation by the assembled Muslim League. The
next day, the League adopted the “Lahore Resolution,” which stated that “no
constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it
is designed … that geographically contiguous units …[in] the areas in which the Muslims
are numerically in a majority … should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent
States’….” 139 Obviously, these demands were a drastic departure from previous
propositions of affiliations through constituent representation or federal models and
demonstrated the first demands for partitioned independence in the Pakistan Movement.
These demands would not be met until 1947.
In the seven years between the Lahore Resolution and independence for India and
Pakistan, one event occurred that finally precipitated the completion of the “sovereignty”
prerequisite through the ultimate partitioning of the two groups. By March of 1942,
Britain was wholly concerned with conducting the war. Yet, the tensions between
Hindus, Muslims, and the British could not be ignored without risking serious conflicts
that could disrupt vital supplies and troops coming from India. Unwilling to compromise
but unable to ignore the situation any longer, Churchill dispatched Sir Stafford Cripps, a
left-wing politician from the Cabinet, to resolve matters. Unfortunately for Cripps,
Churchill’s staunch refusal to offer full independence, effective immediately, meant that
Cripps “was empowered only to repeat the proposals already made in 1940, that is to
offer India full Dominion status after the war (or the option to secede from the EmpireCommonwealth), in return for Indian co-operation during the war and a moratorium on
139
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further political advance for its duration.” 140 Of critical importance, the offer secondarily
included a clause that dictated that “no part of India could be forced to accept
membership of the post-war state, whatever form this took.” 141 Worse yet for Churchill
and Cripps, the INC had long ago lost interest in Dominion status and refused to abandon
demands for an immediate control of the central government, a demand that was quickly
denied. Aware of Britain’s predicament and at Gandhi’s encouragement, the Congress
passed the “Quit India” Resolution. “Quit India” was designed as a nationwide nonviolent protest with the singular objective of forcing the British out of India by making
simultaneous administration of India and the war impossible. At first, the campaign
promised to be a highly effective disruption in light of the outrage directed at the British
and unity of Congress opinion. However, by the next day, the British government had
arrested Gandhi, many of the members of the Congress, and thousands of non-violent
dissenters. With Gandhi and most of the leaders of the Congress imprisoned for the rest
of the war, “a dangerous political vacuum” had been created that allowed many members
of the Muslim League to ascend to provincial administrative positions. Similarly,
without Gandhi presenting counter-arguments, Jinnah pitched his ideas of a separate
Pakistan to the British. In particular, Jinnah argued that, under the Cripps clause that had
reserved the right for any group to refuse membership within the post-war state, the
Muslim League would simply refuse to participate with any British plan that did not
provide for a separate Muslim state, at which point, according to Jinnah, the Muslims
would be effectively autonomous anyway. By the time, Gandhi was released from prison
in 1944, it was apparent to the British, who were still unconvinced on the issue of
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partition, “that there was a real threat … of large-scale anti-British disorders, … aiming
to expel British by paralyzing the administration” much as Gandhi’s Quit India had
attempted in 1942. 142 Coupled with the perpetual “communal strife between Hindus and
Muslims,” the British recognized the volatility of the situation. Still occupied by the war,
though, Churchill’s government continued to procrastinate on the issue. Finally, in 1945,
the post-war Labour government of new Prime Minister Clement Attlee set about
appeasing the demands of the two major nationalist groups. Unfortunately for them, the
British representative sent to reconcile the Congress and the Muslim League soon found
that “Gandhi was indeed a tough negotiator” and, given Jinnah’s characteristic
intransigence on the issue of partition, “[i]t proved impossible to bring Congress and the
Muslim League together.” 143 Both men clung adamantly to their positions with Gandhi
demanding Britain’s departure from a united India and Jinnah demanding partition,
thereby stalemating any proposal. In the end, then, “Pakistan … owed everything to
Jinnah.” 144 Because of his steadfast support for partition and the unity of Muslim support
behind him, the British came to recognize that “Muslim determination … was so great
that chaos and maybe civil war would follow [partition’s] denial. To unite India against
Muslim wishes would necessarily involve force, while dividing India against the wishes
of the Hindus would not. And that was in the end the deciding consideration.” 145
Consequently, on August 15, 1947, the British colonies of India and Pakistan passed into
independent membership within the British Commonwealth of Nations, alongside the
white settler Dominions
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Conclusion
In the end, then, very similar transitions in national identity occurred in both the
Dominions and India; however, in India, the transition resulted in a divisive conclusion,
due in large part to the intransigency of Gandhi and Jinnah, as opposed to the overall
unifying effects seen in the Dominions. As the theoretical framework of this study
highlighted, each national movement redefined its perceptions of unity, its limits, sense
of community, and constitutional sovereignty on the way to gaining full autonomy from
the British Empire. In the British Dominions of South Africa and Canada, ethnically
mixed populations (of European descent) solidified into singular national groups with
separate identities during the 1910-45 era. Comparably, in Australia and New Zealand,
where the settler population was almost singularly of British descent, the same processes
inspired great unity as well, but was initially entrenched in support of the Empire. As a
result, these Dominions’ unity was more gradually disconnected from British loyalties
than elsewhere. Furthermore, in each case, the political leaders of the various groups
were critical reflections of their colony’s changes, such as Jan Smuts and J.M.B. Hertzog
in South Africa, who overcame Boer-British enmity to cooperate against the British or
Robert Borden in Canada who grew increasingly disillusioned and concerned about
Britain’s management of the First World War and thus British leadership in general. As a
result, the cases of the Dominions strongly suggest a pattern in the specific kinds of
changes that must occur for nationalist movements to succeed as well as indicating that
the process is fundamentally a unifying phenomenon. Additionally, the transformations
of Indian nationalists’ thought also supported the prerequisites pattern shown in the
Dominions. However, the pattern in India ended entirely differently than in the
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Dominions due in large part to upper echelon disagreements between Mohandas Gandhi
and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Interestingly contrasting Smuts and Hertzog in South Africa,
Gandhi and Jinnah originally sought to cooperate with each other’s group before the
Indian nationalist movement split along religious divisions. In addition, Jinnah’s critical
part in the creation of this nationalist Hindu-Muslim cleavage is another powerful
indication of the central role that nationalist leaders occupy in the evolution of nationalist
movements toward statehood. Ultimately, then, while each case presented its own
distinct context, a pattern of changing self-perceptions in successful nationalist
movements against the British Empire is evident and suggests that a larger Empire-wide
process may have existed. Future research would do well to explore this possibility.
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